
























zur Zukunft der Arbeit
Institute for the Study 
of Labor 
Evolution of the Industrial Wage Structure 
in China Since 1980





Evolution of the Industrial Wage 
Structure in China Since 1980 
 
 
O Hyun Kwon 
Peking University  
 
Belton M Fleisher 















P.O. Box 7240   
53072 Bonn   
Germany   
 
Phone: +49-228-3894-0  







Any opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and not those of IZA. Research published in 
this series may include views on policy, but the institute itself takes no institutional policy positions. 
 
The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center 
and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent nonprofit 
organization supported by Deutsche Post Foundation. The center is associated with the University of 
Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its international network, workshops and 
conferences, data service, project support, research visits and doctoral program. IZA engages in (i) 
original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of 
policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public.  
 
IZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. 
Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be 














Evolution of the Industrial Wage Structure in China Since 1980
* 
 
Industry mean wages in China have exhibited sharply increased dispersion since the early 
1990s. The upward trend in differences of average wages among major industry groups 
parallels increases in wage and income inequality not only between rural and urban sectors 
but within the urban economy as well. Research on the trend has focused on (1) how market 
forces have led to a better match between worker pay and worker skills; on (2a) how the 
growing share of employment in the private sector has “caused” growing wage inequality; 
and (2b) how residual government control in a few industrial sectors has contributed to wage 
inequality due monopoly rent sharing. We show that the industrial wage dispersion in China 
has evolved to match long-recognized international patterns of industrial wage dispersion and 
that an increasing proportion of industrial wage dispersion can be explained as returns to 
observed worker characteristics. 
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1.  Introduction 
Wagedifferentials under planning in China, Eastern Europe, and the Soviet 
Union were severely compressed relative to the norm in market economies. In their 
post-planning transition to wage structures determined by market forces, all of these 
formerly planned economies have experienced increased dispersion of wages and 
incomes. This growing inequality is observed in industrial, occupational, skill, 
schooling, and regional dimensions. We focus on the evolution of the industrial wage 
structure (IWS) in Chinafor two reasons: (i)a number of scholars and commentators 
question whether rising inequality in China is the result of market forces or the result of 
barriers to competition in industries where government retains a dominant ownership 
position; (ii) the IWS has received the attention of economists for more than 60 years 
and remains a topic with tantalizing unanswered questions today. We document that 
industrial wage dispersion in China, while very low in 1978, now ranks high among 
major industrial economies. However, the pattern of wage dispersion across industries 
is highly correlated across countries, including China. Although traditionally 
high-wage industries are those that tend to have highly concentrated ownership, we find 
that wage inequality across industries in China is higher, and has grown more, in the 
non-State-owned sector than it has among state-owned units (SOUs) and 
collectively-owned units. The hypothesis that the growing dispersion of China’s IWS is 
the result of market forces common to the world’s major market economies is not 
rejected by our empirical results. 
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we illustrate the 
evolution of the IWS in China since the beginning of economic reform. Section 3 
contains a brief history of the literature on the IWS and presents our methodology. We 
present our empirical results in section 4, and section 5 concludes. 
2. The Chinese Industrial Wage Structure Since 1978. 
As stated in the Introduction, a major feature of China’s IWS is the dramatic 3 
 
increase in wage dispersion over the past 30 years or more. Figure 1 showsthe 
coefficient of variationof mean industrial wages in China, the United States, Canada, 
and four major industrial economies in Europe over various time periods through 2007 
or 2008. The dispersion of industrial wages in China was very low compared to most 
other countries until the late 1980s; it accelerated sharply between 1993 and 1995, a 
period of rapid increase in the proportion of workers in China’s non-public employment 
sectors (Gustafsson and Li, 2001), probably encouraged by the policy changes 
associated with Deng Xiao Ping’s Southern Tour in 1992. The upward trend has 
continued, increasing after the year 2003. In contrast to China, the IWS trends in the 
other countries depicted in figure 1 were quite stable. A similar stability in the industrial 
wage dispersion for 8 nations in the European Union over the period 1991 through 2002 
is reported in Genre, Kohn, and Moferatou (2009). Similarly to the data in figure 1, 
Genre, Kohn, and Monferatou show that Spain (and Portugal) have the highest degree 
of industrial wage dispersion, while Finland, not represented in figure 1, has a much 
more compressed IWS, comparable to that of China prior to 1993. 
A second major feature of the IWS in China is its convergence toward a stable 
and common international pattern of high-wage versus low-wage industries. To 
illustrate the stability over time of the IWS, figure 1shows that the rank correlation of 
industry average wages in the United States in 1978 with average wages in 2008 was 
0.90. In contrast, the rank correlation of industry average wages in 1978 with 2008 is 
less than 0.50, gradually rising over time, by definition, to 1.0 in 2008.Table 2 and 
figure 2 show the correlation of average industry wages in eight major industrialized 
economies in recent years with average industry wages in China between 1978 and 
2008. There is a distinct upward trend in the correlation over the period, with the 
average correlation coefficient exceeding 0.6 in each year since 2004. 
3.  Literature and Methodology 
Two major features of the lengthy literature on the IWS are the persistence of 
high correlation of industry wages over time and their high average correlation across 
countries. 
In a classic paper Slichter (1950) noted that wage rates varied significantly 4 
 
across major industry categories in ways that could not readily be explained in terms of 
perfectly competitive labor markets and that the inter-industry structure of wages was 
quite stable over time, the rank correlation of mean wages between 1923 and 1946, 
following the Second World War being 0.88. Since then it has been shown in numerous 
papers that stability is not only persistent but extends to a surprising extent across 
industrialized economies. For example, the correlation between mean industrial wages 
in the United States in 1984 with mean industrial wages in China in the year 2002 is 0.9. 
Time-stability of the Industrial Wage Structure 
In a seminal paper, Slichter (1950) used data collected by the National 
Industrial Conference Board to show that the rank correlation of mean hourly earnings 
between 1923 and 1946 is 0.73, concluding,  "The inter-industry structure of wages has 
considerable stability during short or moderately periods of time". In a frequently cited 
work, Krueger and Summers (1987) corroborate the over-time stability of the industrial 
wage structure. They compare the United States industrial wage structure in 1923 with 
that in 1984 and find the correlation of  log wages to be  0.56. Moreover they believe 
this to be an underestimate attributable to changes in industry definitions and sampling 
error. Further evidence is obtained when the wages of 9 major industries in 1900 are 
related to those in 1920 and 1984.  They find log wage correlations of 0.80 and 0.62, 
respectively. 
Later research including DIXON(1995),…. Use data from countries other than 
the US and respectively corroborate the finding that industrial wage structure is stable 
over time. Therefore, it seems that researchers in this topic has basically reached a 
consensus that industrial wage structure is stable across time. 
Similarity of Industrial Wage Structures across Developed Countries 
A major contribution of Krueger and Summers (1987) is to confirm results 
reported in earlier work (Lebergott, 1947, Dunlop and Rothbaum, 1955, and Papola and 
Bharadwaj, 1970) that the industrial wage structure is highly correlated across 
industrialized economies.  Data for  13 countries yield correlations of industrial wages 
with the United States that exceed 0.8 for 8 countries and more than 0.6 for 11 
countries..  More recently, Genre, Momferatou, and Mourre (2005) report that 5 
 
industrial wage averages are highly correlated across Euro Zone countries although 
they differ substantial in their degree of dispersion. US. There is also evidence ( Erdil 
and Yetkiner, 2001) that there is a significant, positive rank correlation of industrial 
wages between industrialized and developing economies.  
Puzzles and explanatory models related to the Industrial Wage Structure 
It might be argued that industrial wage differentials unexplained by observed 
worker characteristics mainly reflect market disequilibrium. We find it implausible that 
disequilbria can account for the long-term stability of the IWS within countries and its 
similarity across economies. Thus, understanding the IWS requires exploration of the 
underlying market equilibria that determine it. 
Competitive explanation: Equalizing differentials.Writers at least since Slichter 
(1950) have offered a variety of explanations of the IWS. In general they take as a 
benchmark the competitive hypothesis (Reder, 1962), which in its simplest form states 
that equally productive workers should receive equal wages regardless of which 
industry employs them. The simple competitive hypothesis has always been interpreted 
much more richly and is perhaps expressed most eloquently in Rosen (1986), who 
states, “The theory of equalizing differences refers to observed wage differentials 
required to equalize the total monetary and nonmonetary advantages or disadvantages 
among work activities and among workers themselves (p. 641). It is assumed that both 
sides of the market (employers and employees) possess perfect information about 
worker and job chacteristics. As Rosen emphasizes, empirical testing of the 
competitive hypothsis(es) is extremely difficult, because it require matched 
employer-employee data with detailed information about both worker and job 
characteristics. Consequently, consensus on the degree to which observed wage 
distributions correspond to the competitive paradigm remains elusive. Testing is further 
complicated by the introduction asymetric information and the need to distinguish 
between observations of long-run equilibrium and short-term demand or supply 
shocks.   
(i)Variation in labor characteristics. In a competitive labor market equilibrium 
pay would correspond to worker skill, and inter-industry variation in average wage 6 
 
levels would correspond to variation in skill levels. Any residual wage variation after 
skills have been accounted for would compensate employees (negatively or positively) 
for heterogenous working conditions such as safety, comfort, work-hours flexibility, 
and so on. In general, observable skills and working conditions cannot account for all of 
the IWS. In their 1987 paper, Krueger and Summers regress industry mean log wage 
rate on measures of worker skills and other characteristics (e.g. gender) and can account 
for about 40 per cent of observed industry wage dispersion. Moreover, the residual 
industry wage differentials’ rank correlation with the raw differentials is about 0.9. The 
extent to which the unexplained differentials reflect unobserved labor quality or reflect 
deviation from the competitive paradigm is unanswered. 
An appealing method to control for unobserved worker characteristics is to 
examine the wages for workers who change jobs. However, a challenge is to account 
for selection bias that arises because voluntary job change should require that workers 
are offered higher wages or better working conditions on their new jobs than they 
received in their old jobs. After accounting for such bias, Krueger and Summers find 
that residual industrial wage differentials are not significantly reduced. They conclude 
that this “cast[s] doubt on explanations of industry wage differentials based on 
unmeasured quality”. Gibbons and Katz (1987) and Blackburn and Neumark (1988) 
reach a similar conclusion. However, Murphy and Topel (xxxx), using a differentCPS 
sample and different method of correcting for selection bias find that the industrial 
wage differentials for workers who change industries are only one-third of total 
industrial wage differentials, which suggests that two-thirds are explained by 
unobserved worker characteristics. 
(ii) Variation in job characteristics and endogeneity.  Accounting for 
unobserved worker characteristics is complicated by the two-way exchange of worker 
services for job amenities emphasized by Rosen (1986). In the competitive paradigm, 
the observation that seemingly similar occupations are paid more in some industries 
than in others (Krueger and Summers 1987, Katz and Summers 1989) must be 
attributable to industry-specific job amenities or working conditions.  For example, 
mining jobs are intrinsically dangerous and often require working in dark and otherwise 7 
 
unpleasant locations. Workers who are less averse to working in dark, dangerous places 
are more likely to select into mining jobs in return for a lower wage premium than 
workers who are more averse. Consider, however, a worker who leaves a mining job for 
a job in another industry in return for better job amenities. If we attribute 
industry-specific wage residuals in a sample of industry-job changers to unobserved 
worker characteristics, we risk serious error and omitted variable bias to the extent that 
industry-specific job amenities are ignored. A further complication is that worker 
characteristics are tied to the individual; his/her aversion to dark places cannot in 
general be separated in the job market from his/her schooling, place of birth, parental 
education, and so on. Thus, even with perfect labor mobility, the bundling of worker 
characteristics may militate against equalization of returns to observed or unobserved 
worker characteristics across industries. 
The two-sided nature of the job transaction and the likely endogeneity of many 
job amenities and some worker characteristics (schooling, for example) make 
over-time and cross-country comparisons still more complex than measuring the IWS 
at a point in time in a given economy. Consider, for example, the industry wage residual 
for mining in China compared to the United States. As is shown in our empirical results, 
mining is a “high-wage” industry in the United States and a “low-wage” industry in 
China. We conjecture that Chinese mining jobs are not intrinsically less dangerous than 
those in the United States. (Indeed casual reading of news reports would suggest the 
opposite.) Nor do we find it plausible that Chinese workers have vastly different 
preferences than do American miners. But tradeoffs occur at the margin on both the 
employer and employee sides of the wage bargain. An equilibrium outcome in which 
Chinese workers who face far less attractive job alternatives than those in the United 
States would be more inclined to accept a lower wage premium for unattractive jobs 
(and less likely to form labor unions) and in which employers would not find it 
profitable to invest in costly safety measures and other items to improve working 
conditions is entirely plausible. Thus, the difference between the United States and 
China wage gap for mining compared to other industries is consistent with identical 8 
 
worker preferences and industry production functions in the two countries, and the 
over-time and cross-country similarity of IWS results is remarkable indeed.  
(iii.) Challenges to the Competitive Hypothesis: Efficiency Wage Hypotheses 
and Rent-Sharing.The persistence over time and across countries of unexplained 
industry-wage differentials presents a serious challenge to the competitive hypothesis 
under the assumption of full information. Two contending explanations involve 
relaxing the assumption of full information and/or the assumption of profit 
maximization. 
High-wage industries tend to be those in which employers have a relatively high 
degree of market power as measured by standard concentration ratios or by firm size 
and this has been by some observers as evidence of monopoly rent sharing (Brown and 
Medoff 1985,Kwoka 1983, Mishel 1982, Dickens and Katz 1986b). Slichter (1950), 
Pugel (1980), and Dickens and Katz (1986b) also note that industries with high profit 
ratios tend to be correlated with higher wage payments. However, Krueger and 
Summers (1988) note that profit rates across industries tend to be insensitive to a broad 
range of wage variation, suggesting that higher wages lead to lower overall costs, cet. 
par. For example, high-wage industries tend to have lower quit rates, which means that 
employers can avoid additional hiring and training costs (Katz and Summers 1989, 
Akerlof, rose, and Yellen 1989). Krueger and Summers (1988) analyze the role of 
efficiency wage models in accounting for the residual IWS. They note that 
efficiency-wage models can explain employers’ choices to pay higher wages than their 
employees would receive in alternative jobs as a means to avoid costs associated with 
monitoring and worker turnover. They observe that it is difficult to separate 
profit-maximization from utility-maximization motives (e.g. agency problems in large 
corporations (Brown and Medoff, 1985)) in empirical evaluation of the residual IWS, 
and they “…prefer to regard rent sharing as a species of efficiency wage theory rather 
than as an alternative explanation for wage differentials.” They call for future research 
to isolate the causes of the residuals unexplained by observed worker and job 
characteristics. 
Another issue related to rent sharing is unionization. Unions can bargain 9 
 
successfully for higher wages in industries where rents are high, and the degree of 
unionization may be endogenously related to employer market power. There is 
evidence that industry average wage rates are positively correlated with the extent of 
unionization unionization rate, but Krueger and Summers (1987) find that high wage 
industries tend to pay high wages even before the advent of wide-scale unionization, 
and … which is an evidence casting some doubt on whether correlation between 
industry average wage and high unionization can be interpreted as a causal relationship. 
 Recent Research on the Industrial Wage Structure in China 
Research in the IWS in China has focused on explaining  growing wage and 
income inequality, especially among the urban population. Chen, Lu, and Wan (2010) 
regress industry average wages on the “usual suspects” including worker characteristics 
and industry dummy variables and find that over half of the industry wage dispersion 
(holding constant worker characteristics) is attributable to two 
industries—transportation, storage, post office, and communication; and finance and 
insurance. Since these two industries are dominated by government-owned enterprises, 
they infer that government monopoly explains the recent rise in industrial wage 
differentials. in the two industries mentioned is the reason why there is a rise in 
industrial wage differentials in recent years.Yue, Li and Sicular (2010) divide industries 
into competitive and monopolistic sectors and use a Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition 
finding that the residual industry wage differential (holding worker characteristics 
constant) is “unreasonably large” in terms of what might be attributable to unobserved 
worker characteristics. They conclude that the high wages in these industries is 
attributable in large part to rent sharing.  
Other recent research addresses the issue of growing urban wage inequality but 
does not focus in wage differentials by industry group. Ho, Dong, Bowles, and 
MacPhail (2002) note that privatization of rural industries in two provinces of China 
were associated with increased wage dispersion of workers according to their education, 
experience, and gender and that patterns were similar across different types of private 
ownership. Whalley and Xing (2010) come to somewhat different conclusions than do 
the authors of the two papers cited above. Their analysis, based on household surveys 10 
 
for the years 1995, 2002, and 2007, finds that the majority of the increase in urban wage 
inequality is attributable to the rise in the private sector’s employment share, although 
rising inequality within the publicly-owned sector is also an important contributor. 
Démurger, Li, and Yang analyze changes in public-private sector earnings differentials 
between 2002 and 2007 and report that although worker characteristics are increasingly 
important in explaining wage differentials, segmentation by ownership category 
remains an obstacle to workers in the lower-wage categories. 
Methodology.Our econometric approach follows the literature in identifying 
industry wage differences and in attempting to account for them in identifying the 
effects of differences in worker characteristics across major industry groups. We use 
economy-wide industry aggregate data to estimate China’s IWS and micro household 
survey data to obtain estimates of the contribution of worker characteristics to the 
industrial wage dispersion in China. Although we do not have matched 
worker-employer data, we can obtain industry and firm ownership data from the 
household information. However, we cannot proceed further than to obtain 
reduced-form estimates of the contributions of worker characteristics and employer 
ownership category to the IWS in China. Nevertheless, we believe that we achieve our 
goals: (i) to discover the degree to which the increasing dispersion of China’s IWS can 
be explained in terms wage differentials that correspond to worker characteristics; (ii) 
to account for the contributions of privatization and market competition to the 
evolution of China’s IWS.  
Our basic model is 
  01 2 ln   ii i WI X β ββ = ++  (1) 
where 
is the ith person’s main-job total earnings; 
is a set of industry dummies indicating the industry of the main job; and 
Xi is a set of worker characteristics including experience and dummy variables for 
highest educational attainment, gender, Chinese Communist Party membership, 
minority group status, and ownership type. 11 
 
4.  Empirical Results 
The estimation results for equation (1) are contained in table 3. Columns (1), (2), 
and (3) contain the estimation results for regressions that contain only the industry 
dummy variables. Columns (4), (5), and (6) report results including the worker control 
variables included in the vector X, and columns (7) and (8) report results comparable to 
those in (5) and (6) in which the dependent variable is hourly earnings.
2The regression 
results are not sensitive to whether total or hourly earnings is used as dependent 
variable, so we limit our discussion to the estimates based on total earnings, which is 
available for all survey years. 
Contribution of Worker Characteristics.As illustrated in data based on industry 
aggregates, the dispersion of mean industrial wages has increased sharply. The standard 
deviation of the log-wage industry coefficients without worker characteristic controls 
doubled between 1988 and 1995, and doubled again by the year 2002. When worker 
controls are included, the standard deviation of the industry coefficients more than 
doubles between 1988 and 1995 and increases by 67 percent between 1995 and 2002. 
The overall increase between 1988 and 2002 is four fold for the industry coefficients 
without worker controls and approximately 3.5 with worker controls.As a benchmark, 
we compare the standard deviation of the industry hourly wage coefficients with 
worker controls in the year 2002, 0.14, to that reported by Krueger and Summers (1984), 
0.17. 
The last row of table shows the proportion of the dispersion of the IWS that can 
be accounted for in terms of worker characteristics, including firm-ownership sector. 
The proportion of the IWS dispersion that is accounted for by worker characteristics 
(including ownership sector)  is [1-( SD(Yes)÷SD(No))]and increases from 7 percent in 
1988 to 12 percent in 1995 and 28 percent in the year 2002. When the dependent 
variable is hourly earnings, the proportion of the IWS dispersion accounted for by 
worker characteristics increases from 16 percent in 1995 to 30 percent in 2002. It is 
particularly noteworthy that most of the increased “explanatory power” of worker 
                                                               
2Work hours data are not available in CHIP 1988. 12 
 
characteristics comes from increasing returns to schooling as reflected in wages 
(holding industry group constant). Comparing column (6) with column (4), the 
estimated coefficient for professional school increases by 5-fold, that for upper middle 
school by a ratio of about 4.7, and for university graduates by a ratio of about 4.0. Thus 
the implicit annual rate of return to four years of college education increased from 
about 3.8% in 1988 to 12.7% in 2002. There is a vast literature on increased returns to 
schooling in China as estimated from Mincer-type equations that documents similar 
increases in the return to schooling in China during the reform period, and we do not 
cite it here.  
Other noteworthy changes in the coefficients of worker characteristics are an 
increase in the coefficient of the male gender dummy from 0.06 to 0.14, a shift of the 
coefficient of the minority status dummy from -0.025 and -.058 in 1995 to 0.06 in 2002. 
We note with particular interest that the coefficient of other-owned units (OOU) 
increased sharply between 1988 and 1995, but it decreased to virtually zero in 2002. 
With log hourly earnings as the dependent variable, the coefficient of the OOU dummy 
falls from 0.37 in 1995 to -0.055 in 2002. 
Contribution of Ownership Sector. As noted in our literature survey, the driving 
force behind increased (urban) income inequality in China appears to be the rising 
proportion of workers in the non-public sector. As illustrated clearly in figures 3 and 4, 
the coefficient of variation of industry mean wages among OOU has been far greater 
than other ownership sectors, while the proportion of workers and staff employed in 
OOU has increased from negligible in 1980b to over 50 percent in 2008. At the same 
time, the degree of wage dispersion has risen in all sectors, although in proportionate 
terms, more so in state-owned and collectively-owned units. This observation, in 
conjunction with the virtual disappearance of the earnings advantage of employment in 
the non-public sector as evidenced by the worker characteristic coefficients in table 3 
implies increasing integration of China’s industrial labor force. 13 
 
 
5. Summary and Conclusion 
The hypothesis that increasing industry-wage dispersion in China has been 
driven by the rise of competitive labor-market forces cannot be rejected on the basis of 
our empirical results. The rise in wage inequality can be explained as a result of 
increasing pay differentials according to observed worker characteristics particularly 
schooling. Moreover, since differential pay within the non-publicly owned sector has 
been much greater than within the state-owned sector, the rising proportion of workers 
in the private sector has increased overall wage inequality. The fact that the industrial 
wage pattern in China has come to match more closely the ranking of high- and 
low-wage industries across countries, a ranking that has been remarkably stable over 
time, implies that fundamental market forces are at work. Yet fascinating problems 
remain. (1) To what extent is the proportion of industry wage differentials unexplained 
by observed worker characteristics the result of pay for unobserved talents and abilities? 
(2) To what extent do high wage industries pay more simply because they are more 
profitable, and (3) how can rent sharing be separated from an efficiency-wage 
explanation of unexplained industry-wage differentials? Resolving these issues 
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1978  0.4965  0.3455  0.9091  
1980  0.4685  0.3091  0.9021  
1985  0.4056  0.2273  0.8951  
1988  0.4755  0.3182  0.9231  
1991  0.4476  0.2818  0.9231  
1992  0.6573  0.5545  0.9231  
1993  0.5245  0.3818  0.9231  
1994  0.7133  0.6273  0.9161  
1997  0.8392  0.7909  0.9161  
2000  0.7063  0.6182  0.9580  
2003  0.8042  0.7455  0.9650  
2006  0.9580  0.9455  0.9650  
























Average   0.3252 0.3071 0.6385 0.6352 
Australia_2004  0.4091 0.4436 0.4427 0.4624  10
Australia_2006  0.3411 0.4037 0.4082 0.4130  10
Canada_2007  0.8530 0.8989 0.0787 0.0710  10
Canada_2008  0.8514 0.8844 0.0992 0.0967  10
Denmark_2006  0.3957 0.3962 0.6084 0.6242  9
Denmark_2007  0.3552 0.3389 0.6869 0.7019  9
France_2001  0.2963 0.2761 0.7903 0.7889  10
France_2002  0.2634 0.2492 0.7697 0.7746  10
Germany_20007  0.2330 0.2246 0.7440 0.7353  9
Germany_2008  0.2380 0.2302 0.7486 0.7409  9
Japan_2007  0.3895 0.3493 0.5028 0.4768  7
Japan_2008  0.3894 0.3517 0.5008 0.4723  7
Korea_2007  0.4897 0.4471 0.7785 0.7643  9
Korea_2008  0.4590 0.4046 0.6984 0.6853  9
Netherlands_200
4 
0.1372 0.2028 0.4707 0.4849  10
Netherlands_200
5 
0.1316 0.1957 0.4752 0.4914  10
Portugal_2007  0.2161 0.1132 0.8721 0.8559  9
Portugal_2008  0.2432 0.1400 0.8688 0.8522  9
Spain_2007  0.2091 0.1626 0.8977 0.8866  9
Spain_2008  0.2124 0.1641 0.9049 0.8953  9
Switzerland_2006 ‐ 0.0875 0.1633 0.8144 0.8086  10
Switzerland_2008 ‐ 0.1009 0.1819 0.8169 0.8128  10
Taiwan_2007  0.6152 0.5838 0.6783 0.6488  8
Taiwan_2008  0.5831 0.5540 0.6928 0.6620  8
UK_2006  0.1846 0.1840 0.6019 0.6300  10

























Mining and Quarry  0.03  0.02  0.01  0.009 ‐ 0.02 ‐ 0.04 ‐ 0.005 ‐ 0.01  .26 





Construction  0.039 ‐ 0.07  0.16  0.04 ‐ 0.04  0.058 ‐ 0.06  0.05  .15 
Trade, Hotels, Restrnts  0.02 ‐ 0.16














Real Estate ‐ 0.04 ‐ 0.03  0.38
***  ‐0.03  0.04  0.25
**  0.021  0.26
**   
Public Admin & Defense  0.07  0.09  0.33
**  ‐0.005  0.02  0.09  0.01  0.06  
Education  0.06  0.15
**  0.22
*  ‐0.04  0.06  0.10  0.08  0.19 ‐ .19 
Health & Social Work  0.04  0.13
*  ‐0.13 ‐ 0.002  0.11
*  ‐0.12  0.09 ‐ 0.13 ‐ .20 
Primary School       0.069**  0.14  0.49**  0.20  0.10  
Lower Middle         0.12**  0.23*  0.71***  0.31**  0.43*  
Professional School       0.19***  0.43***  0.99***  0.53***  0.75***  
Upper Middle School       0.20***  0.34***  0.93***  0.44***  0.67***  
Technical College       0.23***  0.55***  1.19***  0.66***  0.94***  
University Graduate       0.35***  0.61***  1.41***  0.73***  1.16***  
Experience (Age‐Schooling)     0.034***  0.048***  0.025***  0.049***  0.022***  
Experience
2 (÷10
3)       ‐ 0.48*** ‐ 0.71*** ‐ 0.25*** ‐ 0.70*** ‐ 0.16**  
Male       0.060***  0.11***  0.14***  0.091***  0.093***  
Communist Party       0.067***  0.11***  0.089***  0.11***  0.085***  
Minority       ‐ 0.025 ‐ 0.058*  0.06 ‐ 0.10***  0.090*  
Coop Owned Unit       ‐ 0.075*** ‐ 0.21*** ‐ 0.18*** ‐ 0.22*** ‐ 0.19***  
Other Owned Unit       0.29***  0.48***  0.013  0.37*** ‐ 0.055***  
Constant  5.04***  8.53***  9.04***  4.39***  7.48***  7.67*** ‐ 0.30**  0.32  
N  5704  6872  5660  5704  6872  5660  6872  5660  
R
2  0.017  0.018  0.061  0.25  0.21  0.19  0.196  0.189  
StdDev of IndCoeff  0.05  0.10  0.20  0.043  0.09  0.15  0.10  0.16  
SD(Yes)÷SD(No) (note 5)       0.93  0.88  0.72  0.84  0.70  
Notes:  
1.The dependent variable is log monthlyearnings in columns 1 through 6 and monthly earnings divided by hours worked in columns 7 and 8. 
2. Data come from China Household Income Project (CHIP) surveys conducted in…….Column 9 is from Krueger and Summers (198_). 
Samples include respondents who reported themselves to be working or employed, including self-employed. Farmers are excluded. 
3. Omitted dummy variables are (a) schooling level less than primary or illiterate; ownership is State; Omitted schooling level is less than 
primary and iliiterate; omitted ownership is SOE. 
4. Significance levels are  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
5. The standard deviation of the industry coefficients with worker characteristics included divided by the standard deviation without worker 
















Figure 4. Proportion of Workers and Staff by Ownership Sector 
 
 